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  <title>pwn.watch: VS Code incident updates</title>
  <link>https://pwn.watch/t/vscode</link>
  <description>Live security incidents worldwide: CVEs, patch status, fixed versions, advisories and the posts that broke them.</description>
  <language>en</language>
  <lastBuildDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:04:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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  <item>
    <title>[high] GhostAction returns: hijacked GitHub accounts push secret-stealing 'security audit' workflows to 30k+ repos</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/ghostaction-github-workflows-oct-2026</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/ghostaction-github-workflows-oct-2026</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:04:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;GhostAction, a campaign first documented by GitGuardian in Sept 2025, came back in 2026. It hit 772 repos in Aug-Sep 2026, then surged on Oct 8-12: about 1,900 compromised GitHub accounts pushed fake 'security audit' workflows to 30,000+ repositories (GitGuardian). The new payload exfiltrates the repo's Actions secrets plus every credential found in the full git history to 193.32.204.199 over plain HTTP. GitHub began preventing the workflow from running around Oct 9. The operator moved on to GitHub-themed phishing (my-github.com) and a VS Code tasks.json + fake .woff2 font stealer found in 94 repos.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; live · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-16: OpenSourceMalware finds a second stage in 94 repos: VS Code tasks.json autoruns a stealer hidden in a fake Font Awesome .woff2 and installs a 5-minute cron. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-13: GitGuardian update: Oct 8-12 wave targeted 30,000+ repos across ~3,000 users/orgs from ~1,900 compromised accounts; 3,174 secrets targeted. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.gitguardian.com/ghostaction-github-actions-supply-chain-attack-returns/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-11: Phishing kit on my-github.com steals password + 2FA and silently authorizes an OAuth app with repo/workflow scopes. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/ghostaction-attackers-plant-credential.html&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] TeamPCP supply-chain campaign: Trivy → Checkmarx GitHub Actions</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/teampcp-trivy-checkmarx-supply-chain</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/teampcp-trivy-checkmarx-supply-chain</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Threat actors tracked as TeamPCP compromised Trivy releases and GitHub Actions (including trivy-action / setup-trivy), then expanded into Checkmarx AST and KICS Actions and related artifacts. Malware stole CI/CD credentials (exfil as tpcp.tar.gz). Microsoft, Sysdig, CSA Singapore and Checkmarx published guidance in March 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; trivy-action &amp;gt;= v0.35.0, setup-trivy &amp;gt;= v0.2.6, Checkmarx AST/KICS patched releases per Checkmarx updates&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-03: Trivy compromise disclosed; Microsoft guidance published.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-03: Campaign expands to Checkmarx GitHub Actions (Sysdig / Checkmarx updates).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] GlassWorm: self-spreading VS Code / OpenVSX extension worm hidden in invisible Unicode</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/glassworm-vscode-openvsx-worm-october-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/glassworm-vscode-openvsx-worm-october-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Koi Security found extensions on OpenVSX (and one on Microsoft's marketplace) carrying JavaScript hidden in invisible Unicode variation selectors. The malware stole npm, GitHub, Git and OpenVSX credentials to infect more extensions, went after crypto wallets, and set up SOCKS proxies and hidden VNC.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious releases removed from the marketplaces&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-20: Wider coverage; Microsoft marketplace extension also affected (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/self-spreading-glassworm-malware-hits-openvsx-vs-code-registries/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-17: Koi Security discloses GlassWorm on OpenVSX (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.koi.ai/blog/glassworm-first-self-propagating-worm-using-invisible-code-hits-openvsx-marketplace&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
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