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  <title>pwn.watch: Nation-state incident updates</title>
  <link>https://pwn.watch/t/nation-state</link>
  <description>Live security incidents worldwide: CVEs, patch status, fixed versions, advisories and the posts that broke them.</description>
  <language>en</language>
  <lastBuildDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
  <atom:link href="https://pwn.watch/t/nation-state/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
  <item>
    <title>[high] SonicWall: state actor stole firewall config backups of every cloud-backup customer</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/sonicwall-mysonicwall-cloud-backup-breach-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/sonicwall-mysonicwall-cloud-backup-breach-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;SonicWall and Mandiant confirmed that a state-sponsored actor used an API call to pull firewall configuration backup files for all customers using MySonicWall cloud backup, after first saying fewer than 5% were affected. The files include credentials and network details, so customers had to reset firewall, VPN, directory and API secrets.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; no-fix-needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11: SonicWall says the investigation is complete and attributes it to a state-sponsored actor (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sonicwall.com/blog/cloud-backup-security-incident-investigation-complete-and-strengthened-cyber-resilience&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-08: SonicWall and Mandiant confirm all cloud-backup customers' files were accessed (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/sonicwall-firewall-configs-stolen-for-all-cloud-backup-customers/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-17: SonicWall discloses unauthorized access to cloud backup files (initially &amp;lt;5% of customers) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sonicwall.com/support/notices/mysonicwall-cloud-backup-file-incident/kA1VN0000000RoD0AU&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] F5 breached by nation-state actor: BIG-IP source code and undisclosed bugs stolen</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/f5-nation-state-breach-big-ip-source-code-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/f5-nation-state-breach-big-ip-source-code-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;F5 disclosed that a sophisticated nation-state actor had long-term access to its BIG-IP development and engineering systems and stole parts of the BIG-IP source code, information on undisclosed vulnerabilities and some customer configuration data. CISA issued Emergency Directive 26-01 ordering agencies to inventory and patch F5 gear. Researchers linked it to China-nexus UNC5221 and BRICKSTORM.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; F5 October 2025 Quarterly Security Notification releases&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-15: F5 discloses the breach (SEC 8-K) and ships patches (&lt;a href=&quot;https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K000154696&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-15: CISA issues Emergency Directive 26-01 for F5 devices (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/ed-26-01-mitigate-vulnerabilities-f5-devices&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-09: F5 learns of the intrusion (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1048695/000104869525000149/ffiv-20251015.htm&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] BeyondTrust Remote Support breach reaches US Treasury (CVE-2024-12356)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/beyondtrust-remote-support-us-treasury-breach-cve-2024-12356</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/beyondtrust-remote-support-us-treasury-breach-cve-2024-12356</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 30 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Attackers stole a BeyondTrust infrastructure API key for its Remote Support SaaS service and used it to reset local passwords and access 17 customer instances. The US Treasury, one of the customers, said a China state-sponsored actor accessed some Departmental Offices workstations and unclassified documents. During the investigation BeyondTrust found a critical command injection in Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access (CVE-2024-12356, CVSS 9.8) and patched it on 2024-12-16. Added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2024-12-19.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Patches BT24-10-ONPREM1 / BT24-10-ONPREM2 (BeyondTrust); cloud instances patched 2024-12-16&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-30: Treasury tells Congress of a 'major incident' attributed to a China state-sponsored APT (&lt;a href=&quot;https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/25472698/letter-from-treasury-re-december-2024-cyberattack.pdf&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-19: CISA added CVE-2024-12356 to the KEV catalog (federal deadline 2024-12-27) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-17: CVE-2024-12356 published (&lt;a href=&quot;https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12356&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2024-12356&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Salt Typhoon: Chinese state hackers inside US telecom networks</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/salt-typhoon-us-telecom-breaches</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/salt-typhoon-us-telecom-breaches</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;PRC-affiliated actors (publicly called Salt Typhoon) compromised networks at multiple US telecommunications companies. The FBI and CISA said they stole customer call records, got into the private communications of a limited number of people mainly involved in government or political activity, and copied information subject to US law enforcement wiretap requests. Allied agencies then published hardening guidance for communications infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; no-fix-needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-04: CISA, NSA, FBI and Five Eyes partners release hardening guidance for communications infrastructure (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/enhanced-visibility-and-hardening-guidance-communications-infrastructure&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-11-13: FBI and CISA joint statement on PRC targeting of commercial telecommunications (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-fbi-and-cisa-peoples-republic-china-prc-targeting-commercial-telecommunications&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] Midnight Blizzard breaches Microsoft corporate email</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/microsoft-midnight-blizzard-corporate-email-breach</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/microsoft-midnight-blizzard-corporate-email-breach</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Russia's Midnight Blizzard (APT29) password-sprayed a legacy, non-production Microsoft test tenant without MFA, then abused an OAuth app to read email of Microsoft senior leadership and security staff. Microsoft detected the attack on 2024-01-12. Stolen emails included correspondence with US federal agencies, so CISA issued Emergency Directive 24-02 ordering agencies to analyze the exposed emails and reset any compromised credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; no-fix-needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-04-02: CISA issues Emergency Directive 24-02 for agencies whose email with Microsoft was exposed (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/ed-24-02-mitigating-significant-risk-nation-state-compromise-microsoft-corporate-email-system&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-01-25: Microsoft publishes guidance for responders on the Midnight Blizzard attack (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-01-12: Microsoft detects a nation-state attack on its corporate systems (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/25/midnight-blizzard-guidance-for-responders-on-nation-state-attack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
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