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  <title>pwn.watch: Infostealer incident updates</title>
  <link>https://pwn.watch/t/infostealer</link>
  <description>Live security incidents worldwide: CVEs, patch status, fixed versions, advisories and the posts that broke them.</description>
  <language>en</language>
  <lastBuildDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:04:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
  <atom:link href="https://pwn.watch/t/infostealer/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
  <item>
    <title>[critical] SubQuery @subql/common 5.8.3 published with credential stealer + backdoor</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/subql-common-npm-backdoor</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/subql-common-npm-backdoor</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:04:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;On Oct 5 2026 @subql/common 5.8.3 was published to npm through SubQuery's own GitHub Actions trusted publisher, after a short-lived branch changed the release step to swap the built package for a tarball downloaded from ci-artifacts.dev. The payload ran on install (postinstall) and on import, stole CI/cloud/GitHub/npm/Kubernetes/Vault/SSH and AI-tool credentials, offered a reverse shell, and with a workflow-scoped token tried to push a secret-dumping workflow. It was live about 50 minutes; 5.8.2 is the safe version. Many @subql packages accept 5.8.3 through their version ranges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; @subql/common 5.8.2 (npm 'latest')&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-10: SubQuery maintainer: compromised token deleted, security review started. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/subquery/subql/issues/3047&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-06: GMO Flatt Security publishes payload analysis and response guidance. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://flatt.tech/research/posts/subql-common-npm-supply-chain-attack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-05T11:56Z: Malicious @subql/common 5.8.3 published via the repo's GitHub Actions trusted publisher (canary 5.8.3-onf-rt1 published ~32 min earlier). (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/subql-ecosystem-compromised&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; GHSA-9333-3c4x-x3h5, MAL-2026-17571&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Shai-Hulud 2.0: worm backdoors ~800 npm packages incl. Zapier, PostHog, Postman, ENS</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-2-npm-worm-november-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-2-npm-worm-november-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A second wave of the Shai-Hulud worm ran in npm preinstall scripts (setup_bun.js), stole credentials with TruffleHog and pushed them to public GitHub repos, then republished packages with any npm tokens it found. Datadog counted 796 backdoored packages with 20M+ weekly downloads; Wiz saw 25,000+ attacker repos.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions unpublished; use versions published after 2025-11-24 per each vendor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11-26: GitHub privatizes malicious repos; public count drops to ~300 (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-ongoing-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11-26: PostHog publishes its post-mortem (&lt;a href=&quot;https://posthog.com/blog/nov-24-shai-hulud-attack-post-mortem&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11-24: First compromised package published (03:10 UTC) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://panther.com/blog/a-data-driven-analysis-of-the-sha1-hulud-2-0-campaign&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Shai-Hulud: first self-replicating npm worm hits 500+ packages incl. @ctrl/tinycolor and CrowdStrike</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-npm-worm-september-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-npm-worm-september-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A worm spread through npm by stealing maintainers' npm and GitHub tokens with TruffleHog, then republishing their packages with a malicious bundle.js postinstall. It created shai-hulud GitHub workflows to exfiltrate secrets and made private repos public. CISA counted more than 500 affected packages, including @ctrl/tinycolor and several @crowdstrike packages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed from npm; upgrade to versions published after the incident&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-23: CISA alert: widespread supply chain compromise impacting npm (500+ packages) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/09/23/widespread-supply-chain-compromise-impacting-npm-ecosystem&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-16: Largest burst, nearly 100 packages, including @crowdstrike scope (&lt;a href=&quot;https://socket.dev/blog/ongoing-supply-chain-attack-targets-crowdstrike-npm-packages&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-15: Worm discovered; @ctrl/tinycolor and ~40 packages found compromised (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sysdig.com/blog/shai-hulud-the-novel-self-replicating-worm-infecting-hundreds-of-npm-packages&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] s1ngularity: malicious Nx releases used AI CLIs to hunt secrets, 5,500+ private repos exposed</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/nx-s1ngularity-npm-supply-chain-august-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/nx-s1ngularity-npm-supply-chain-august-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Attackers abused a GitHub Actions injection bug in nrwl/nx to steal its npm token and published malicious nx and @nx/* versions for about four hours. The postinstall script used local AI CLIs (Claude, Gemini, Q) to find secrets and pushed them to public s1ngularity-repository repos. A second phase used stolen GitHub tokens to make 5,500+ private repos public.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed from npm (see GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-28/29: Second phase: 5,500+ private repos of 400+ users/orgs made public with stolen tokens (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wiz.io/blog/s1ngularity-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-27: GitHub disables attacker-created s1ngularity repositories (09:00 UTC) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wiz.io/blog/s1ngularity-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-26: Malicious nx 21.5.0 and others published; npm removes them and revokes tokens that evening (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] eslint-config-prettier and friends hijacked via npnjs.com phishing (CVE-2025-54313)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/eslint-config-prettier-npm-phishing-cve-2025-54313</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/eslint-config-prettier-npm-phishing-cve-2025-54313</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A maintainer was phished through the typosquat domain npnjs.com. The attacker published malicious eslint-config-prettier versions whose install script ran node-gyp.dll on Windows, dropping the Scavenger infostealer. eslint-plugin-prettier, synckit, @pkgr/core, napi-postinstall and later the 'is' package were also hit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed; use other eslint-config-prettier versions (see CVE record)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-07-22: Malicious 'is' package versions found in the same campaign (&lt;a href=&quot;https://socket.dev/blog/npm-is-package-hijacked-in-expanding-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-07-18: Malicious eslint-config-prettier versions published after maintainer phishing (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-54313&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2025-54313&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Snowflake customer accounts raided with infostealer credentials (Ticketmaster, AT&amp;T and others)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/snowflake-customer-data-theft-unc5537</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/snowflake-customer-data-theft-unc5537</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A financially motivated group Mandiant tracks as UNC5537 logged into Snowflake customer accounts using credentials stolen by infostealer malware, some dating back to 2020, on accounts without MFA or network allow lists. It then stole data and extorted the victims. Mandiant and Snowflake notified about 165 potentially exposed organizations. Victims included Ticketmaster/Live Nation and AT&amp;amp;T, which said call and text records of nearly all its cellular customers were taken. Mandiant found no breach of Snowflake's own enterprise environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; no-fix-needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-07-12: AT&amp;amp;T says call and text records of nearly all cellular customers were stolen from its Snowflake workspace (&lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2024/07/nearly-all-att-subscribers-call-records-stolen-in-snowflake-cloud-hack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-06-10: Mandiant publishes its UNC5537 report: about 165 organizations notified (&lt;a href=&quot;https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc5537-snowflake-data-theft-extortion&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-05-31: Live Nation 8-K confirms the Ticketmaster data theft; the database was hosted on Snowflake (&lt;a href=&quot;https://techcrunch.com/2024/05/31/live-nation-confirms-ticketmaster-was-hacked-says-personal-information-stolen-in-data-breach/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] CircleCI breach: rotate every secret</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/circleci-security-incident-rotate-all-secrets-2023</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/circleci-security-incident-rotate-all-secrets-2023</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 13 Jan 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Malware on a CircleCI engineer's laptop stole a 2FA-backed SSO session. The attacker then exfiltrated customer environment variables, tokens and keys along with the encryption keys, so CircleCI told every customer to rotate all secrets stored in the platform.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; no-fix-needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-01-13: Incident report: malware stole an engineer's SSO session in December 2022; customer data and encryption keys were exfiltrated (&lt;a href=&quot;https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-01-04: CircleCI tells all customers to rotate every secret stored in CircleCI (&lt;a href=&quot;https://circleci.com/blog/january-4-2023-security-alert/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
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