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  <title>pwn.watch: Supply chain updates</title>
  <link>https://pwn.watch/c/supply-chain</link>
  <description>Live security incidents worldwide: CVEs, patch status, fixed versions, advisories and the posts that broke them.</description>
  <language>en</language>
  <lastBuildDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:12:55 GMT</lastBuildDate>
  <atom:link href="https://pwn.watch/c/supply-chain/feed.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
  <item>
    <title>[critical] eMudhra intermediate CA private keys compromised</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/emudhra-intermediate-ca-compromise</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/emudhra-intermediate-ca-compromise</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:12:55 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Eight eMudhra Global TLS intermediate CA private keys were found to be cryptographically weak / recoverable (researcher report Oct 18). Mozilla, Chrome, Apple and Microsoft blocked the intermediates; eMudhra revoked them Oct 19 and the ECC root was distrusted as a precaution. Downstream runtimes that ship their own trust stores (Go, Node.js, Electron, Python certifi, curl, etc.) needed emergency CA-bundle updates so they stop trusting the compromised chains.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; live · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Electron 44.9.1 / 43.8.1 / 42.11.16, Go 1.27.3 / 1.26.10, Node.js 22.23.4 / 24.22.1 / 26.12.1, Python certifi 2026.10.19, NSS 3.131.1, Java 27.0.1.0.2 / 25.0.5.0.2 / 21.0.13.0.2 / 17.0.21.0.2 / 11.0.33.0.2 / 8u511+ (CVE-2026-91403), Deno 2.9.8, rustls-webpki 0.103.16 / webpki-roots 1.0.10, pip 26.2.2 / uv 0.13.4 / sigstore 4.5.1 / conda 26.9.4 / pixi 0.82.1 (Python ecosystem), Ubuntu/Debian/Alpine/Fedora/Arch ca-certificates updates (see tracker), Docker Desktop 4.96.2, mitmproxy 12.3.0, LibreSSL 4.2.3 / 4.3.4 / 4.4.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-22: Tracker lists patched releases across distros, language runtimes and tools; Bun, Erlang certifi and Bottlerocket still pending. mitmproxy 12.3.0 drops eMudhra CAs. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-22: eMudhra says a flaw in its April 30 2025 key generation ceremony produced a second set of weak keys, and those were the ones published to root stores; root cause still under investigation, replacement certs being issued to customers. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theregister.com/security/2026/10/22/certification-authority-emudhra-defends-its-laughably-weak-private-keys/5304647&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-22: Internet Freedom Foundation says it has written to eMudhra, India’s Controller of Certifying Authorities and CERT-In asking for a fix. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://x.com/internetfreedom/status/2113234649258615256&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2026-111943, CVE-2026-91403&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] GhostAction returns: hijacked GitHub accounts push secret-stealing 'security audit' workflows to 30k+ repos</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/ghostaction-github-workflows-oct-2026</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/ghostaction-github-workflows-oct-2026</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:12:55 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;GhostAction, a campaign first documented by GitGuardian in Sept 2025, came back in 2026. It hit 772 repos in Aug-Sep 2026, then surged on Oct 8-12: about 1,900 compromised GitHub accounts pushed fake 'security audit' workflows to 30,000+ repositories (GitGuardian). The new payload exfiltrates the repo's Actions secrets plus every credential found in the full git history to 193.32.204.199 over plain HTTP. GitHub began preventing the workflow from running around Oct 9. The operator moved on to GitHub-themed phishing (my-github.com) and a VS Code tasks.json + fake .woff2 font stealer found in 94 repos.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; live · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-16: OpenSourceMalware finds a second stage in 94 repos: VS Code tasks.json autoruns a stealer hidden in a fake Font Awesome .woff2 and installs a 5-minute cron. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://opensourcemalware.com/blog/ghostaction-copycats-polinrider-by-hiding-a-stealer-in-a-fake-font-file&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-13: GitGuardian update: Oct 8-12 wave targeted 30,000+ repos across ~3,000 users/orgs from ~1,900 compromised accounts; 3,174 secrets targeted. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.gitguardian.com/ghostaction-github-actions-supply-chain-attack-returns/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-11: Phishing kit on my-github.com steals password + 2FA and silently authorizes an OAuth app with repo/workflow scopes. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/ghostaction-attackers-plant-credential.html&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[medium] GoDaddy mass-revokes 404,607 TLS certificates over CP/CPS profile mismatch</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/godaddy-mass-certificate-revocation-oct-2026</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/godaddy-mass-certificate-revocation-oct-2026</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:12:55 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>medium</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;GoDaddy (Starfield) found that 404,607 TLS certificates carried policy information (policy OIDs, CPS URI) that didn't match its own published CP/CPS, which under the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements means they must be revoked within five days. GoDaddy missed the Oct 18 deadline and says the certificates were revoked on Oct 21 2026. Nothing was hacked and no keys leaked, but sites still serving a revoked certificate can show browser warnings or become unreachable until the re-issued certificate is installed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; live · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Re-issued certificates from the GoDaddy SSL dashboard (customer must install them)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-21: GoDaddy's customer notice says the incorrectly issued certificates were revoked; affected sites must install the re-issued certificate. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.godaddy.com/help/what-is-the-cpcps-certificate-profile-bug-43095&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-19: 227,422 of 404,607 certificates revoked as of 05:29 UTC. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083191&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-18: Five-day revocation deadline (23:45 UTC) passes with 170,566 certificates revoked; GoDaddy files a delayed-revocation incident. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2083191&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] LiteLLM 1.107.0 PyPI/Docker supply-chain compromise</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/litellm-1-107-0-pypi-compromise</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/litellm-1-107-0-pypi-compromise</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:12:55 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;On Oct 21 2026 attackers compromised LiteLLM’s release pipeline and published malicious litellm==1.107.0 to PyPI (live ~2 hours) plus compromised Docker Hub/GHCR tags (v1.107.0, latest, main-latest, main-stable). The wheels install cook.pth / cook.py / sitecustomize.py that steal cloud, developer and AI-tool credentials at every Python startup and open a remote-code loader. Second LiteLLM compromise of 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; live · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; 1.106.2 (pin; last known safe). Malicious 1.107.0 removed from PyPI, Docker Hub and GHCR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-23: SecurityWeek: the malicious 1.107.0 packages were online for roughly three hours and are estimated to have been downloaded over 49,000 times; enterprise customers pulling from LiteLLM’s private repository were not affected. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.securityweek.com/litellm-compromised-in-fresh-supply-chain-attack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-22: LiteLLM root cause: attacker held three developer GitHub CLI tokens, likely scraped from logs of an internet-exposed internal LiteLLM deployment (Claude Code can echo a gh OAuth token into logged response bodies), disabled branch protection and ran the release workflow against lookalike repo Berri-AI/litellm. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://thehackernews.com/2026/10/litellm-suspects-github-token-leak-in.html&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-22: StepSecurity full teardown: payload exfiltrates to lookalike www.litellm.dev (registered Oct 13) and an hourly loader polls a GitHub dead drop (letters9813/pythonclient-test, now deleted). Infected hosts keep polling, so anyone re-registering that username could run code on them: kill the process holding /tmp/remote_code_loader.lock, delete cook.pth/cook.py/sitecustomize.py, pin 1.106.2 and rotate everything. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/litellm-1-107-0-compromised-pypi-backdoored-wheels-credential-stealer&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; MAL-2026-2144&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] tensorlake@0.5.144 npm Shai-Hulud worm with hostage GitHub token</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/tensorlake-npm-shai-hulud-worm</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/tensorlake-npm-shai-hulud-worm</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 11:12:55 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;On Oct 8 2026, tensorlake@0.5.144 was published from the real GitHub repo (with npm provenance) carrying a preinstall hook that installs a Shai-Hulud-style credential-stealing worm. It harvests npm/GitHub/cloud/SSH/AI-tool secrets, spreads to other packages, and installs a “gh-token-monitor” that wipes the home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked. Pin 0.5.143; remove the monitor before rotating tokens.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; live · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; 0.5.143 (safe pin); remove 0.5.144&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-08: 0.5.144 published via the project’s release workflow.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-08+: StepSecurity / Socket detections and public write-ups; remediation guidance emphasizes removing gh-token-monitor before revoke.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-07: Malicious commits land on tensorlakeai/tensorlake main.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; GHSA-8g63-53c9-65j2&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] SubQuery @subql/common 5.8.3 published with credential stealer + backdoor</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/subql-common-npm-backdoor</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/subql-common-npm-backdoor</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 22 Oct 2026 10:04:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;On Oct 5 2026 @subql/common 5.8.3 was published to npm through SubQuery's own GitHub Actions trusted publisher, after a short-lived branch changed the release step to swap the built package for a tarball downloaded from ci-artifacts.dev. The payload ran on install (postinstall) and on import, stole CI/cloud/GitHub/npm/Kubernetes/Vault/SSH and AI-tool credentials, offered a reverse shell, and with a workflow-scoped token tried to push a secret-dumping workflow. It was live about 50 minutes; 5.8.2 is the safe version. Many @subql packages accept 5.8.3 through their version ranges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; @subql/common 5.8.2 (npm 'latest')&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-10: SubQuery maintainer: compromised token deleted, security review started. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/subquery/subql/issues/3047&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-06: GMO Flatt Security publishes payload analysis and response guidance. (&lt;a href=&quot;https://flatt.tech/research/posts/subql-common-npm-supply-chain-attack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-10-05T11:56Z: Malicious @subql/common 5.8.3 published via the repo's GitHub Actions trusted publisher (canary 5.8.3-onf-rt1 published ~32 min earlier). (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/subql-ecosystem-compromised&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; GHSA-9333-3c4x-x3h5, MAL-2026-17571&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] OVHcloud CLI releases backdoored on GitHub</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/ovhcloud-cli-github-infostealer</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/ovhcloud-cli-github-infostealer</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;In mid-October 2026 OVHcloud said attackers hijacked a developer GitHub account and planted an information stealer in five releases of its open-source CLI. Users who installed those releases should treat workstations as compromised and rotate credentials.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Clean releases after incident; reinstall from verified source&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] TeamUpdraft / UpdraftCentral keys stolen; WordPress sites backdoored</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/updraftcentral-keys-wordpress-backdoor</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/updraftcentral-keys-wordpress-backdoor</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;UK plugin maker TeamUpdraft said attackers breached its website, stole UpdraftCentral connection keys, and used them to backdoor WordPress sites running UpdraftPlus/UpdraftCentral.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] AOMEI Backupper update servers backdoored (Mandiant)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/aomei-backupper-update-supply-chain</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/aomei-backupper-update-supply-chain</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Google Mandiant and ManageEngine reported that a threat actor tampered with AOMEI Backupper update servers mid-2026, pushing a backdoor to users across multiple countries. Disclosure clustered around Oct 16 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Vendor-clean updates after remediation&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Rank Math PRO WordPress plugin download backdoored</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/rank-math-pro-wordpress-backdoor</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/rank-math-pro-wordpress-backdoor</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;SEO plugin vendor Rank Math confirmed attackers tampered with PRO version 3.0.123 on the official download site, planting hidden backdoors during an ~11-hour window. Sites that installed that build should audit and rebuild.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Clean PRO builds after incident&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] CHAINDROP / Mini Shai-Hulud npm worm (keyv + 400+ packages)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-chaindrop-npm-keyv-august</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-chaindrop-npm-keyv-august</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 15 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;In early August 2026 a Mini Shai-Hulud / CHAINDROP worm compromised keyv and related cache packages, then self-propagated via stolen npm tokens to 400+ packages (1B+ monthly downloads across the graph). Payload runs via preinstall (disabled by default on npm 12+), steals npm/GitHub/cloud/CI secrets, and republishes backdoored versions. Microsoft, Elastic, JFrog and Wiz published analyses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Pin known-good versions; purge caches; npm CLI 12+ disables preinstall by default&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-08-04: keyv/cacheable malicious releases observed; worm begins propagating.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-08-04/06: Microsoft, Elastic, JFrog publish analyses; 400+ packages listed.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Mini Shai-Hulud hits AntV / timeago.js npm ecosystem</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-antv-npm-may</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-antv-npm-may</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;May 2026 wave of Mini Shai-Hulud compromised packages across Alibaba’s AntV visualization ecosystem and timeago.js (via npm account atool). Payload harvested CI secrets from GitHub Actions runner memory and dumped credentials to public GitHub repos. StepSecurity documented the ongoing spread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; partial · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Remove malicious versions; rotate CI/cloud secrets; pin clean releases&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] OpenAI employee devices hit via TanStack Mini Shai-Hulud wave</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/openai-employee-devices-tanstack-shai-hulud</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/openai-employee-devices-tanstack-shai-hulud</guid>
    <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;In May 2026 OpenAI confirmed two employee devices were breached as part of the broader TanStack Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain campaign. OpenAI said customer data, production systems, IP and deployed software were not impacted.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] Nx Nx Console: Nx Console Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/nx-nx-console-cve-2026-48027</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/nx-nx-console-cve-2026-48027</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Nx Console contains an embedded malicious code vulnerability that allowed a malicious version of Nx Console to be published. The compromised extension fetched an obfuscated payload that could harvested credentials from multiple sources on disk and in memory. Added to CISA KEV on 2026-05-27.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; See vendor advisory linked in sources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-05-27: CISA added CVE-2026-48027 to the KEV catalog (due 2026-06-10).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2026-48027&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] TeamPCP supply-chain campaign: Trivy → Checkmarx GitHub Actions</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/teampcp-trivy-checkmarx-supply-chain</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/teampcp-trivy-checkmarx-supply-chain</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Threat actors tracked as TeamPCP compromised Trivy releases and GitHub Actions (including trivy-action / setup-trivy), then expanded into Checkmarx AST and KICS Actions and related artifacts. Malware stole CI/CD credentials (exfil as tpcp.tar.gz). Microsoft, Sysdig, CSA Singapore and Checkmarx published guidance in March 2026.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; trivy-action &amp;gt;= v0.35.0, setup-trivy &amp;gt;= v0.2.6, Checkmarx AST/KICS patched releases per Checkmarx updates&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-03: Trivy compromise disclosed; Microsoft guidance published.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2026-03: Campaign expands to Checkmarx GitHub Actions (Sysdig / Checkmarx updates).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] ASUS Live Update: Live Update Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/asus-live-update-cve-2025-59374</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/asus-live-update-cve-2025-59374</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;ASUS Live Update contains an embedded malicious code vulnerability client were distributed with unauthorized modifications introduced through a supply chain compromise. The modified builds could cause devices meeting specific targeting conditions to perform unintended actions. The impacted product could be end-of-life (EoL) and/or end-of-service (EoS). Users should discontinue product utilization. Added to CISA KEV on 2025-12-17.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; See vendor advisory linked in sources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-12-17: CISA added CVE-2025-59374 to the KEV catalog (due 2026-01-07).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2025-59374&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Shai-Hulud 2.0: worm backdoors ~800 npm packages incl. Zapier, PostHog, Postman, ENS</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-2-npm-worm-november-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-2-npm-worm-november-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A second wave of the Shai-Hulud worm ran in npm preinstall scripts (setup_bun.js), stole credentials with TruffleHog and pushed them to public GitHub repos, then republished packages with any npm tokens it found. Datadog counted 796 backdoored packages with 20M+ weekly downloads; Wiz saw 25,000+ attacker repos.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions unpublished; use versions published after 2025-11-24 per each vendor&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11-26: GitHub privatizes malicious repos; public count drops to ~300 (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-ongoing-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11-26: PostHog publishes its post-mortem (&lt;a href=&quot;https://posthog.com/blog/nov-24-shai-hulud-attack-post-mortem&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-11-24: First compromised package published (03:10 UTC) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://panther.com/blog/a-data-driven-analysis-of-the-sha1-hulud-2-0-campaign&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] GlassWorm: self-spreading VS Code / OpenVSX extension worm hidden in invisible Unicode</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/glassworm-vscode-openvsx-worm-october-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/glassworm-vscode-openvsx-worm-october-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Koi Security found extensions on OpenVSX (and one on Microsoft's marketplace) carrying JavaScript hidden in invisible Unicode variation selectors. The malware stole npm, GitHub, Git and OpenVSX credentials to infect more extensions, went after crypto wallets, and set up SOCKS proxies and hidden VNC.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious releases removed from the marketplaces&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-20: Wider coverage; Microsoft marketplace extension also affected (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/self-spreading-glassworm-malware-hits-openvsx-vs-code-registries/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-10-17: Koi Security discloses GlassWorm on OpenVSX (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.koi.ai/blog/glassworm-first-self-propagating-worm-using-invisible-code-hits-openvsx-marketplace&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Shai-Hulud: first self-replicating npm worm hits 500+ packages incl. @ctrl/tinycolor and CrowdStrike</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-npm-worm-september-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/shai-hulud-npm-worm-september-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 23 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A worm spread through npm by stealing maintainers' npm and GitHub tokens with TruffleHog, then republishing their packages with a malicious bundle.js postinstall. It created shai-hulud GitHub workflows to exfiltrate secrets and made private repos public. CISA counted more than 500 affected packages, including @ctrl/tinycolor and several @crowdstrike packages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed from npm; upgrade to versions published after the incident&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-23: CISA alert: widespread supply chain compromise impacting npm (500+ packages) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2025/09/23/widespread-supply-chain-compromise-impacting-npm-ecosystem&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-16: Largest burst, nearly 100 packages, including @crowdstrike scope (&lt;a href=&quot;https://socket.dev/blog/ongoing-supply-chain-attack-targets-crowdstrike-npm-packages&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-15: Worm discovered; @ctrl/tinycolor and ~40 packages found compromised (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sysdig.com/blog/shai-hulud-the-novel-self-replicating-worm-infecting-hundreds-of-npm-packages&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] chalk, debug and 16 other npm packages (2B+ weekly downloads) hijacked via fake 2FA email</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/chalk-debug-npm-hijack-september-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/chalk-debug-npm-hijack-september-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 15 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Maintainer Josh Junon (qix) was phished by a fake npm 2FA-reset email from npmjs.help. The attacker published malicious versions of 18 packages, including chalk, debug, ansi-styles and strip-ansi, with code that hijacked crypto wallet transactions in browsers. They were live for about two hours.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; chalk 5.6.2, ansi-styles 6.2.3, strip-ansi 7.1.2, supports-color 10.2.2, ansi-regex 6.2.2, wrap-ansi 9.0.2, slice-ansi 7.1.2, has-ansi 6.0.2, chalk-template 1.1.2, supports-hyperlinks 4.1.2, debug and others: republished by the maintainer on 2025-09-13&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-15: Initial CVEs posted (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/debug-js/debug/issues/1005&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-13: All remaining affected packages republished by the maintainer (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/debug-js/debug/issues/1005&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-09-08: Malicious versions start appearing on npm (13:16 UTC) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] s1ngularity: malicious Nx releases used AI CLIs to hunt secrets, 5,500+ private repos exposed</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/nx-s1ngularity-npm-supply-chain-august-2025</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/nx-s1ngularity-npm-supply-chain-august-2025</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Attackers abused a GitHub Actions injection bug in nrwl/nx to steal its npm token and published malicious nx and @nx/* versions for about four hours. The postinstall script used local AI CLIs (Claude, Gemini, Q) to find secrets and pushed them to public s1ngularity-repository repos. A second phase used stolen GitHub tokens to make 5,500+ private repos public.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed from npm (see GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-28/29: Second phase: 5,500+ private repos of 400+ users/orgs made public with stolen tokens (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wiz.io/blog/s1ngularity-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-27: GitHub disables attacker-created s1ngularity repositories (09:00 UTC) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wiz.io/blog/s1ngularity-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-08-26: Malicious nx 21.5.0 and others published; npm removes them and revokes tokens that evening (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/nrwl/nx/security/advisories/GHSA-cxm3-wv7p-598c&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] eslint-config-prettier and friends hijacked via npnjs.com phishing (CVE-2025-54313)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/eslint-config-prettier-npm-phishing-cve-2025-54313</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/eslint-config-prettier-npm-phishing-cve-2025-54313</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A maintainer was phished through the typosquat domain npnjs.com. The attacker published malicious eslint-config-prettier versions whose install script ran node-gyp.dll on Windows, dropping the Scavenger infostealer. eslint-plugin-prettier, synckit, @pkgr/core, napi-postinstall and later the 'is' package were also hit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed; use other eslint-config-prettier versions (see CVE record)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-07-22: Malicious 'is' package versions found in the same campaign (&lt;a href=&quot;https://socket.dev/blog/npm-is-package-hijacked-in-expanding-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-07-18: Malicious eslint-config-prettier versions published after maintainer phishing (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-54313&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2025-54313&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] reviewdog action-setup GitHub Action: reviewdog/action-setup GitHub Action Embedded Malicious Code Vulnerability</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/reviewdog-action-setup-github-action-cve-2025-30154</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/reviewdog-action-setup-github-action-cve-2025-30154</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;reviewdog action-setup GitHub Action contains an embedded malicious code vulnerability that dumps exposed secrets to Github Actions Workflow Logs. Added to CISA KEV on 2025-03-24.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; See vendor advisory linked in sources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-03-24: CISA added CVE-2025-30154 to the KEV catalog (due 2025-04-14).&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2025-30154&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] tj-actions/changed-files compromised: CI secrets dumped in 23,000+ repos' logs</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/tj-actions-changed-files-supply-chain-cve-2025-30066</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/tj-actions-changed-files-supply-chain-cve-2025-30066</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 20 Mar 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Attackers repointed the version tags of the popular tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action to a commit that dumped runner memory, printing CI/CD secrets into workflow logs. It started with the compromise of reviewdog/action-setup and was aimed at Coinbase's agentkit repo first. Over 23,000 repositories used the action.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; 46.0.1 (see GitHub advisory GHSA-mw4p-6x4p-x5m5)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-03-20: tj-actions and reviewdog maintainers finish remediation (&lt;a href=&quot;https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/github-actions-supply-chain-attack/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-03-18: CISA adds CVE-2025-30066 to KEV; reviewdog actions found compromised too&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2025-03-15: GitHub removes the action, then restores a cleaned repository (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-detection-tj-actions-changed-files-action-is-compromised&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2025-30066&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] Ultralytics PyPI releases backdoored with a crypto miner</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/ultralytics-pypi-supply-chain-attack</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/ultralytics-pypi-supply-chain-attack</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Attackers compromised the Ultralytics YOLO project's GitHub Actions workflows (by poisoning the Actions cache) and published ultralytics 8.3.41 and 8.3.42 to PyPI with an XMRig cryptominer. They later pushed 8.3.45 and 8.3.46 using a leftover PyPI API token. All four versions were removed. PyPI's analysis credits Trusted Publishing attestations with making the attack auditable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Malicious versions removed from PyPI; see vendor advisory for the clean release&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-11: PyPI publishes its analysis: 8.3.41, 8.3.42, 8.3.45 and 8.3.46 affected and removed (&lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.pypi.org/posts/2024-12-11-ultralytics-attack-analysis/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-05: Issue #18027: published 8.3.41 wheel differs from GitHub and runs an XMRig miner (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/ultralytics/ultralytics/issues/18027&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] @solana/web3.js npm package backdoored to steal private keys</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/solana-web3-js-npm-compromise-cve-2024-54134</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/solana-web3-js-npm-compromise-cve-2024-54134</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A publish-access account for @solana/web3.js was compromised. Malicious versions 1.95.6 and 1.95.7, live on npm from 15:20 to 20:25 UTC on 2024-12-03, exfiltrated private key material from apps and bots that handle keys directly. Non-custodial wallets were generally not affected. Fixed in 1.95.8.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; 1.95.8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-04: GitHub advisory GHSA-jcxm-7wvp-g6p5 published; upgrade to 1.95.8 (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-web3.js/security/advisories/GHSA-jcxm-7wvp-g6p5&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-12-03: Malicious 1.95.6 and 1.95.7 published to npm (15:20-20:25 UTC), then unpublished (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/solana-labs/solana-web3.js/security/advisories/GHSA-jcxm-7wvp-g6p5&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2024-54134&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] @lottiefiles/lottie-player npm package hijacked with a crypto wallet drainer</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/lottiefiles-lottie-player-npm-compromise</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/lottiefiles-lottie-player-npm-compromise</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 31 Oct 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A LottieFiles developer's npm access was abused to publish @lottiefiles/lottie-player 2.0.5, 2.0.6 and 2.0.7 on 2024-10-30. Sites loading the 'latest' build from CDNs like unpkg and jsDelivr showed a wallet-connect popup that tried to drain visitors' crypto wallets. LottieFiles unpublished the versions and released 2.0.8, a copy of 2.0.4.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; 2.0.8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-10-30: Malicious 2.0.5, 2.0.6 and 2.0.7 pushed to npm; users report a wallet popup (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/LottieFiles/lottie-player/issues/254&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-10-30: LottieFiles removes the compromised access, unpublishes the versions and publishes 2.0.8 (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/LottieFiles/lottie-player/issues/254&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] polyfill.io CDN turned malicious on 100k+ sites</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/polyfill-io-supply-chain-attack</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/polyfill-io-supply-chain-attack</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 27 Jun 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;The polyfill.io domain and GitHub account were bought in February 2024 by a Chinese company. The CDN, embedded via cdn.polyfill.io on more than 100,000 sites, then served malicious JavaScript that redirected some mobile visitors to a sports betting site. Sansec exposed it on 2024-06-25. Cloudflare began rewriting polyfill.io links to its own mirror, and Namecheap put the domain on hold.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Remove polyfill.io references or switch to the Cloudflare/Fastly mirrors&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-06-27: Cloudflare rewrites cdn.polyfill.io to its mirror; Namecheap puts the domain on hold (&lt;a href=&quot;https://sansec.io/research/polyfill-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-06-25: Sansec reports the polyfill.io supply-chain attack hitting 100k+ sites (&lt;a href=&quot;https://sansec.io/research/polyfill-supply-chain-attack&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[high] Justice AV Solutions (JAVS) Viewer Installer Embedded Malicious Code</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/justice-av-solutions-viewer-cve-2024-4978</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/justice-av-solutions-viewer-cve-2024-4978</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>high</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Justice AV Solutions (JAVS) Viewer installer contains a malicious version of ffmpeg.exe, named fffmpeg.exe (SHA256: 421a4ad2615941b177b6ec4ab5e239c14e62af2ab07c6df1741e2a62223223c4). When run, this creates a backdoor connection to a malicious C2 server. Added to the CISA KEV catalog on 2024-05-29.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; See vendor advisory linked in sources&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-05-29: CISA added CVE-2024-4978 to the KEV catalog (federal deadline 2024-06-19) (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-05-23: CVE-2024-4978 published (&lt;a href=&quot;https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4978&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2024-4978&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] xz-utils backdoor (CVE-2024-3094)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/xz-utils-backdoor-cve-2024-3094</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/xz-utils-backdoor-cve-2024-3094</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;A maintainer persona, 'Jia Tan', slipped a backdoor into the release tarballs of XZ Utils 5.6.0 and 5.6.1. Through liblzma it targeted OpenSSH's sshd on distributions that link sshd against libsystemd, so a key holder could get unauthenticated remote code execution. Andres Freund spotted it after noticing SSH logins using a lot of CPU on Debian sid. It reached only bleeding-edge distributions such as Fedora 41/Rawhide and Debian unstable before it was caught.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; Downgrade to an uncompromised version such as 5.4.6 Stable (CISA), 5.6.2 clean release (2024-05-29, tukaani.org)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-05-29: Lasse Collin publishes review notes 1.0 and new clean XZ Utils releases (&lt;a href=&quot;https://tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-04-09: XZ Git repositories available on GitHub again (&lt;a href=&quot;https://tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2024-03-30: xz@tukaani.org stops forwarding to Jia Tan (&lt;a href=&quot;https://tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2024-3094&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] Ledger Connect Kit npm package hijacked to drain crypto wallets</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/ledger-connect-kit-npm-supply-chain-2023</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/ledger-connect-kit-npm-supply-chain-2023</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 14 Dec 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Attackers phished a former Ledger employee's npm account and published malicious @ledgerhq/connect-kit versions 1.1.5 to 1.1.7. Because many dApps load it from a CDN without pinning a version, their users were shown wallet-drainer prompts. Ledger shipped a clean 1.1.8 within about 40 minutes of finding out.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; 1.1.8&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-12-14: Malicious connect-kit versions published to npm via a phished ex-employee account; Ledger ships 1.1.8 and the npm versions are removed (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ledger.com/blog/security-incident-report&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[medium] PyPI pauses new users and projects amid a flood of malware</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/pypi-pauses-registrations-malware-flood-2023</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/pypi-pauses-registrations-malware-flood-2023</guid>
    <pubDate>Sun, 21 May 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>medium</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;PyPI temporarily stopped new user registrations and new project names for about a day because malicious users and packages outpaced what its small admin team could handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; no-fix-needed&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-05-21: Registrations resume (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/pypi-temporarily-pauses-new-users-projects-amid-high-volume-of-malware/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-05-20: PyPI suspends new user and new project registration (&lt;a href=&quot;https://status.python.org/incidents/0th66lc1l8by&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[critical] 3CX DesktopApp supply-chain attack (trojanized signed builds)</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/3cx-desktopapp-supply-chain-attack-2023</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/3cx-desktopapp-supply-chain-attack-2023</guid>
    <pubDate>Thu, 20 Apr 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>critical</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;Signed 3CX DesktopApp builds for Windows and macOS shipped with embedded malicious code. Mandiant traced it to a North Korea-linked actor (UNC4736) who first got in through a trojanized X_TRADER install from Trading Technologies: a supply-chain attack caused by another supply-chain attack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched · &lt;strong&gt;Fixed in:&lt;/strong&gt; See vendor advisory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-04-20: Mandiant: the 3CX breach began with a trojanized X_TRADER package, the first software supply-chain attack it had seen caused by another (&lt;a href=&quot;https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/3cx-software-supply-chain-compromise&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-03-30: 3CX confirms the compromise and tells customers to uninstall the Electron desktop app (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.3cx.com/blog/news/desktopapp-security-alert/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-03-29: CrowdStrike reports malicious activity from the signed 3CXDesktopApp on customer machines (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/crowdstrike-detects-and-prevents-active-intrusion-campaign-targeting-3cxdesktopapp-customers/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CVEs:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2023-29059&lt;/p&gt;</description>
  </item>
  <item>
    <title>[medium] GitHub's RSA SSH host key briefly exposed in a public repo</title>
    <link>https://pwn.watch/i/github-rsa-ssh-host-key-exposed-2023</link>
    <guid isPermaLink="true">https://pwn.watch/i/github-rsa-ssh-host-key-exposed-2023</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
    <category>medium</category>
    <category>supply-chain</category>
    <description>&lt;p&gt;GitHub's private RSA SSH host key for github.com was briefly exposed in a public repository. GitHub rotated it as a precaution, which meant anyone connecting over SSH with RSA saw a host key mismatch warning until they updated known_hosts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Status:&lt;/strong&gt; closed · &lt;strong&gt;Patch:&lt;/strong&gt; patched&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Latest updates:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;2023-03-24: GitHub replaces its RSA SSH host key; users must update known_hosts (&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.blog/news-insights/company-news/we-updated-our-rsa-ssh-host-key/&quot;&gt;source&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;</description>
  </item>
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